【台灣國】國防MIT》各型飛彈產量去年逾800枚 中科院16條生產線量能全開, Taiwanese NCIST 16 missile production lines with an annual production of 1,000 missiles in 2023 – 自由時報 Liberty Times Geostrategery and Taiwan Republic 台灣国 classrooms

〔記者羅添斌／台北報導〕為因應中國軍事威脅，軍方加速量產各型國產飛彈，大幅增加戰備及庫儲飛彈，高層人士今天指出，中科院以16條生產線全面生產各型飛彈，去年的飛彈總產量合計超過800枚，預估今年明年將達到產能高峰，可達年產量1000枚飛彈的階段目標。國防部以「海空戰力提升計畫採購特別預算」，委由中科院量產包括劍翔無人攻擊載具丶萬劍彈丶雄昇飛彈丶天弓三型防空飛彈丶陸射型與艦射型劍二飛彈丶增程型空射劍二飛彈丶雄三及增程雄三反艦飛彈等，中科院先前投資興建的飛彈量產廠房順利運作，目前各型飛彈的生產線，已開到16條之多，可說是能量全開。

Without a breakdown of which missiles are produced in what quantity annually, it is difficult to assess the significance of “1,000” – though it is a good sign that Taiwan Republic, Japan, and US are all addressing the logistics of a war against China. Taiwanese “indigenous” missiles are a product of the peculiar stage in Taiwan-US-China relations – a product of compromise and the fictional One China status quo. I wonder if policymakers in DC have seriously studied and throught through the implications of having the Taiwanese continue this dual track – purchasing/importing US-made missiles while investing in domestically manufactured missiles. Perhaps the blurb from the recent US-Taiwan military talks about “enhancing munitions coproduction” is a way to discuss this issue – from economies of scale, to whether NCIST missiles are more vulnerable to Chinese communist infiltration and sabotage, to obstacles to interoperability with Japanese and American units. An example: during the war can the US-made Patriots efficiently coordinate with the Taiwanese TK2 and TK3 surface-to-air missiles? How about Taiwanese naval units using American Harpoons and Taiwanese HF series? Or Taiwanese artillery units using Taiwanese MLRS and soon-to-be imported American HIMARS?

A final observation: while it is good that Taiwan’s CSIST is moving away from the “handcrafted” model of manufacturing missiles into the modern mass assembly, one of the many chasms between the Taiwan military and Taiwanese democracy is in this island nation’s economic dynamism and know-how, and how isolated the military remains. Simple question: should a quasi-state military research entity like CSIST even manufacture missiles? Or would it be best to adopt the model from Israel, or Singapore, or South Korea, or Japan, have CSIST coordinate strategic level priority weapon systems research, and subcontract manufacturing to private or public-private corporations? 10.2.2023

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