
If this report is accurate, that the US will sell more than four batteries of the NASAMS to Taiwan Republic for Taipei, Hualien, Taitung, and CCK Air bases, the system itself is fine. Two things to note. Taiwan’s domestic military production has a technological and a production bottleneck. I am worried about the Chinese communist’s ability to infiltrate critical information on Taiwan-developed weapons. What Taiwan’s domestic weapons development has lacked, and this is related to the unsteady and contradictory US policies, is the ability to focus on systems and platforms where Taiwan has the most technological advantage, and leave the other systems to imports. A cursory review of what Taiwan has tried to domestically develop over the last two decades shows a catalog of everything and anything – many items, advanced torpedoes, and next-generation jet fighters, probably do not make sense; while other items, drones, and unmanned vehicles, guided antitank missiles, long-range counterstrike missiles, could have used more focus and investments.
But then one could and should do the same thing with decades of contradictory American policy. Take a peek at the list of major weapons the US sold to Taiwan for the last few decades and it is difficult to create a coherent national security narrative out of them. The F-16A/B with Sparrow missiles instead of the F-16C/D because? Why the Kidd class destroyers and not AEGIS/VLS destroyers/frigates? Why did the US actively obstruct Taiwan’s attempts to acquire submarines for decades? The underlying mistaken premise – that Chinese communist military ambition can be managed by DC, that if the communists decide to invade and annex Taiwan it will be because Taipei and/or DC “provoked” such a decision, has infused America’s decisions on what weapon systems can be sold to Taiwan. This is where short-range systems like the NASAMS represent that continued mistaken notion from the US – “defensive,” “not provocative,” “short-range/point defense,” – while lacking a consistent strategic and tactical vision. Given limited defense resources in Taiwan, Japan, and the US, do the short-range NASAMS belong in the top ten missiles Taiwan Republic must purchase now? The answer to that depends on the level of strategic clarity and commitment the US provides to Taiwan and other democratic allies in this region. 28.9.2022
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